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1 Introduction
About ten years ago, Itamar Pitowsky and I wrote a paper, ‘Two dogmas about quantum
mechanics’ [1], in which we outlined an information-theoretic interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. Here I revisit the paper
and, following Frauchiger and Renner [2], I show that the Everett interpretation leads to
modal contradictions in ‘Wigner’s-Friend’-type scenarios that involve ‘encapsulated’
measurements, where a super-observer (which could be a quantum automaton), with
unrestricted ability to measure any arbitrary observable of a complex quantum system,
measures the memory of an observer system (also possibly a quantum automaton) af-
ter that system measures the spin of a qubit. In this sense, the Everett interpretation is
inconsistent.
2 The Information-Theoretic Interpretation
The salient difference between classical and quantummechanics is the noncommutativ-
ity of the algebra of observables of a quantum system, equivalently the non-Booleanity
of the algebra of two-valued observables representing properties (for example, the
property that the energy of the system lies in a certain range of values, with the two
eigenvalues representing ‘yes’ or ‘no’), or propositions (the proposition asserting that
the value of the energy lies in this range, with the two eigenvalues representing ‘true’
or ‘false’). The two-valued observables of a classical system form a Boolean algebra,
isomorphic to the Borel subsets of the phase space of the system. The transition from
classical to quantum mechanics replaces this Boolean algebra by a family of ‘inter-
twined’ Boolean algebras, to use Gleason’s term [5], one for each set of commuting
two-valued observables, represented by projection operators in a Hilbert space. The
intertwinement precludes the possibility of embedding the whole collection into one
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inclusive Boolean algebra, so you can’t assign truth values consistently to the propo-
sitions about observable values in all these Boolean algebras. Putting it differently,
there are Boolean algebras in the family of Boolean algebras of a quantum system, for
example the Boolean algebras for position and momentum, or for spin components in
different directions, that don’t fit together into a single Boolean algebra, unlike the cor-
responding family for a classical system. In this non-Boolean theory, probabilities are,
as von Neumann put it, ‘sui generis’ [6] and ‘uniquely given from the start’ [7, p. 245]
via Gleason’s theorem, or the Born rule, as a feature of the geometry of Hilbert space,
related to the angle between rays in Hilbert space representing ‘pure’ quantum states.1
The central interpretative question for quantummechanics as a non-Boolean theory
is how we should understand these ‘sui generis’ probabilities, since they are not proba-
bilities of spontaneous transitions between quantum states, nor can they be interpreted
as measures of ignorance about quantum properties associated with the actual values
of observables prior to measurement.
The information-theoretic interpretation is the proposal to take Hilbert space as the
kinematic framework for the physics of an indeterministic universe, just as Minkowski
space provides the kinematic framework for the physics of a non-Newtonian, relativis-
tic universe.2 In special relativity, the geometry of Minkowski space imposes spatio-
temporal constraints on events to which the relativistic dynamics is required to con-
form. In quantum mechanics, the non-Boolean projective geometry of Hilbert space
imposes objective kinematic (i.e., pre-dynamic) probabilistic constraints on correla-
tions between events to which a quantum dynamics of matter and fields is required to
conform. In this non-Boolean theory, new sorts of nonlocal probabilistic correlations
are possible for ‘entangled’ quantum states of separated systems, where the correlated
events are intrinsically random, not merely apparently random like coin tosses (see Bub
[10, Chapter 4]).
In [11], Pitowsky distinguished between a ‘big’ measurement problem and a ‘small’
measurement problem. The ‘big’ measurement problem is the problem of explaining
how measurements can have definite outcomes, given the unitary dynamics of the the-
ory. The ‘small’ measurement problem is the problem of accounting for our familiar
experience of a classical or Boolean macroworld, given the non-Boolean character of
the underlying quantum event space. The ‘big’ problem is the problem of explaining
how individual measurement outcomes come about dynamically, i.e., how something
indefinite in the quantum state of a system beforemeasurement can become definite in a
measurement. There is nothing analogous to this sort of transition in classical physics,
where transitions are always between an initial state of affairs specified by what is and
is not the case (equivalent to a 2-valued homomorphism on a Boolean algebra) to a
final state of affairs with a different specification of what is and is not the case. The
‘small’ problem is the problem of explaining the emergence of an effectively classical
probability space for the macro-events we observe in a measurement.
The ‘big’ problem is deflated as a pseudo-problem if we reject two ‘dogmas’ about
1This conceptual picture applies to quantum mechanics on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. A restric-
tion to ‘normal’ quantum states is required for quantum mechanics formulated with respect to a general von
Neumann algebra, where a generalized Gleason’s theorem holds even for quantum probability functions that
are not countably additive. Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out.
2See Michel Janssen [8] for a defense of this view of special relativity contra Harvey Brown [9].
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quantum mechanics. The first dogma is the view that measurement in a fundamental
mechanical theory should be treated as a dynamical process, so it should be possible,
in principle, to give a complete dynamical analysis of how individual measurement
outcomes come about. The second dogma is the interpretation of a quantum state as
a representation of physical reality, i.e., as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the
occurrence and non-occurrence of events, analogous to the ontological significance of
a classical state.
The first dogma about measurement is an entirely reasonable demand for a fun-
damental theory of motion like classical mechanics. But noncomutativity or non-
Booleanity makes quantum mechanics quite unlike any theory we have dealt with be-
fore in the history of physics, and there is no reason, apart from tradition, to assume
that the theory can provide the sort of representational explanation we are familiar
with in a theory that is commutative or Boolean at the fundamental level. The ‘sui
generis’ quantum probabilities can’t be understood as quantifying ignorance about the
pre-measurement value of an observable, as in a Boolean theory, but cash out in terms
of ‘what you’ll find if you measure,’ which involves considering the outcome, at the
Boolean macrolevel, of manipulating a quantum system in a certain way.
A quantum ‘measurement’ is not really the same sort of thing as a measurement
of a physical quantity of a classical system. It involves putting a microsystem, like a
photon, in a macroscopic environment, say a beamsplitter or an analyzing filter, where
the photon is forced to make an intrinsically random transition recorded as one of a
number of macroscopically distinct alternatives in a macroscopic device like a photon
detector. The registration of the measurement outcome at the Boolean macrolevel is
crucial, because it is only with respect to a suitable structure of alternative possibilities
that it makes sense to talk about an event as definitely occurring or not occurring,
and this structure—characterized by Boole as capturing the ‘conditions of possible
experience’[12]—is a Boolean algebra.
In special relativity, Lorentz contraction is a kinematic effect of motion in a non-
Newtonian space-time. The contraction is consistent with a dynamical account, but
such an account takes the forces involved to be Lorentz covariant, which is to say
that the dynamics is assumed to have symmetries that respect Lorentz contraction as
a kinematic effect of relative motion. (By contrast, in Lorentz’s theory, the contrac-
tion is explained as a dynamical effect in Newtonian space-time.) Analogously, the
loss of information in a quantum measurement—Bohr’s ‘irreducible and uncontrol-
lable disturbance’—is a kinematic effect of any process of gaining information of the
relevant sort, irrespective of the dynamical processes involved in the measurement pro-
cess. A solution to the ‘small’ measurement problem—a dynamical explanation for the
effective emergence of classicality, i.e., Booleanity, at the macrolevel—would amount
to a proof that the unitary quantum dynamics is consistent with the kinematics, analo-
gous to a proof that relativistic dynamics is consistent with the kinematics.
We argued in ‘Two dogmas’ that the ‘small’ measurement problem can be resolved
as a consistency problem by considering the dynamics of the measurement process and
the role of decoherence in the emergence of an effectively classical probability space
of macro-events to which the Born probabilities refer. (The proposal was that decoher-
ence solves the ‘small’ measurement problem, not the ‘big’ measurement problem—
decoherence does not provides a dynamical explanation of how an indefinite outcome
3
in a quantum superposition becomes definite in the unitary evolution of a measurement
process.) An alternative solution is suggested by Pitowsky’s combinatorial treatment of
macroscopic objects in quantum mechanics [13]. Entanglement witnesses are observ-
ables that distinguish between separable and entangled states. An entanglementwitness
for an entangled state is an observable whose expectation value lies in a bounded in-
terval for a separable state, but is outside this interval for the entangled state. Pitowsky
showed, for a large class of entanglement witnesses, that for composite systems where
measurement of an entanglement witness requires many manipulations of individual
particles, entangled states that can be distinguished from separable states become rarer
and rarer as the number of particles increases, and he conjectured that this is true in
general. If Pitowsky’s conjecture is correct, a macrosystem in quantum mechanics can
be characterized as a many-particle system for which the measure of the set of entan-
gled states that can be distinguished from separable states tends to zero. In this sense,
a macrosystem is effectively a commutative or Boolean system.
On the information-theoretic interpretation, quantum mechanics is a new sort of
non-representational theory for an indeterministic universe, in which the quantum state
is a bookkeeping device for keeping track of probabilities and probabilistic correlations
between intrinsically random events. Probabilities are defined with respect to a single
Boolean perspective, the Boolean algebra generated by the ‘pointer-readings’ of what
Bohr referred to as the ‘ultimate measuring instruments,’ which are ‘kept outside the
system subject to quantum mechanical treatment’ [14, pp. 23–24]:
In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it
is of course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency em-
ployed in the measuring processes. . . . The only significant point is that in
each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales and clocks
which determine the frame of space-time coordination—on which, in the
last resort, even the definition of momentum and energy quantities rest—
must always be described entirely on classical lines, and consequently be
kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical treatment.
Bohr did not, of course, refer to Boolean algebras, but the concept is simply a
precise way of codifying a significant aspect of what Bohr meant by a description ‘on
classical lines’ or ‘in classical terms’ in his constant insistence that (his emphasis) [15,
p. 209]
however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical ex-
planation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms.
by which he meant ‘unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminol-
ogy of classical physics’—for the simple reason, as he put it, that we need to be able
‘to tell others what we have done and what we have learned.’ Formally speaking, the
significance of ‘classical’ here as being able ‘to tell others what we have done and what
we have learned’ is that the events in question should fit together as a Boolean algebra,
so conforming to Boole’s ‘conditions of possible experience.’
The solution to the ‘small’ measurement problem as a consistency problem does
not show that unitarity is suppressed at a certain level of size or complexity, so that the
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non-Boolean possibility structure becomes Boolean and quantum becomes classical at
the macrolevel. Rather, the claim is that the unitary dynamics of quantum mechanics
is consistent with the kinematics, in the sense that treating the measurement process
dynamically and ignoring certain information that is in practice inaccessible makes it
extremely difficult to detect the phenomena of interference and entanglement associ-
ated with non-Booleanity. In this sense, an effectively classical or Boolean probability
space of Born probabilities can be associated with our observations at the macrolevel.
Any system, of any complexity, is fundamentally a non-Boolean quantum system
and can be treated as such, in principle, which is to say that a unitary dynamical anal-
ysis can be applied to whatever level of precision you like. But we see actual events
happen at the Boolean macrolevel. At the end of a chain of instruments and recording
devices, some particular system,M , functions as the ‘ultimate measuring instrument’
with respect to which an event corresponding to a definite measurement outcome oc-
curs in an associated Boolean algebra, whose selection is not the outcome of a dy-
namical evolution described by the theory. The system M , or any part of M , can be
treated quantum mechanically, but then some other system,M ′, treated as classical or
commutative or Boolean, plays the role of the ultimate measuring instrument in any ap-
plication of the theory. The outcome of a measurement is an intrinsically random event
at the macrolevel, something that actually happens, not described by the deterministic
unitary dynamics, so outside the theory. Putting it differently, the ‘collapse,’ as a con-
ditionalization of the quantum state, is something you put in by hand after recording
the actual outcome. The physics doesn’t give it to you.
As Pauli put it [16]:
Observation thereby takes on the character of irrational, unique actuality
with unpredictable outcome. . . . Contrasted with this irrational aspect of
concrete phenomena which are determined in their actuality, there stands
the rational aspect of an abstract ordering of the possibilities of statements
by means of the mathematical concept of probability and the ψ-function.
A representational theory proposes a primitive ontology, perhaps of particles or
fields of a certain sort, and a dynamics that describes how things change over time.
The non-Boolean physics of quantum mechanics does not provide a representational
explanation of phenomena. Rather, a quantum mechanical explanation involves show-
ing how a Boolean output (a measurement outcome) is obtained from a Boolean input
(a state preparation) via a non-Boolean link. If a ‘world’ in which truth and falsity,
‘this’ rather than ‘that,’ makes sense is Boolean, then there is no quantum ‘world,’ as
Bohr is reported to have said,3 and it would be misleading to attempt to picture it. In
this sense, a quantum mechanical explanation is ‘operational,’ but this is not simply a
matter of convenience or philosophical persuasion. We adopt quantummechanics—the
theoretical formalism of the non-Boolean link between Boolean input and output—for
empirical reasons, the failure of classical physics to explain certain phenomena, and
because there is no satisfactory representational theory of such phenomena.
3Aage Petersen [17, p. 12]: ‘When asked whether the algorithm of quantum mechanics could be consid-
ered as somehow mirroring an underlying quantum world, Bohr would answer, “There is no quantum world.
There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find
out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.”
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Quantum mechanics on the Everett interpretation is regarded, certainly by its pro-
ponents, as a perfectly good representational theory: it explains phenomena in terms of
an underlying ontology and a dynamics that accounts for change over time. As I will
show in the following section, the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions
in scenarios that involve ‘encapsulated’ measurements.
3 Encapsulated Measurements and the Everett Inter-
pretation
According to the Born rule, the probability of finding the outcome a in a measurement
of an observableA on a system S in the state |ψ〉 =∑a〈a|ψ〉|a〉 is:
pψ(a) = Tr(PaPψ) = |〈a|ψ〉|2 (1)
where Pa is the projection operator onto the eigenstate |a〉 and Pψ is the projection
operator onto the quantum state. After the measurement, the state is updated to
|ψ〉 −→ |a〉 (2)
On the information-theoretic interpretation, the state update is understood as condition-
alization (with necessary loss of information) on the measurement outcome.
For a sequence of measurements, perhaps by two different observers, ofA followed
byB on the same system S initially in the state |ψ〉, whereA andB need not commute,
the conditional probability of the outcome b of B given the outcome a of A is
pψ(b|a) = pψ(a, b)∑
b pψ(a, b)
=
pψ(a, b)
pψ(a)
= Tr(PbPa) = |〈b|a〉|2 (3)
with pψ(a, b) = |〈a|ψ〉|2 · |〈b|a〉|2 = pψ(a) · |〈b|a〉|2.
According to Everett’s relative state interpretation, a measurement is a unitary
transformation, or equivalently an isometry, V , that correlates the pointer-reading state
of the measuring instrument and the associated memory state of an observer with the
state of the observed system. (In the following, I’ll simply refer to the memory state,
with the understanding that this includes the measuring instrument and recording de-
vice and any other systems involved in the measurement.) In the case of a projective
measurement by an observerO, the transformationHS V−→ HS ⊗HO maps |a〉S onto
|a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O , where |Aa〉O is the memory state correlated with the eigenstate |a〉S , so
|ψ〉 V−→ |Ψ〉 =
∑
a
〈a|ψ〉|a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O (4)
Baumann and Wolf [3] formulate the Born rule for the memory state |Aa〉O of
the observer O having observed a in the relative state interpretation, where there is
no commitment to the existence of a physical record of the measurement outcome as
classical information. The probability of the observer O observing a in this sense is
qψ(a) = Tr(1⊗ PAa · V PψV †) (5)
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where PAa is the projection operator onto the memory state |Aa〉O . This is equivalent
to the probability pψ(a) in the standard theory.
This equivalence can also be interpreted as showing the movability of the notorious
Heisenberg ‘cut’ between the observed system and the composite system doing the
observing, if the observing system is treated as a classical or Boolean system. The
cut can be placed between the system and the measuring instrument plus observer,
so that only the system is treated quantum mechanically, or between the measuring
instrument and observer, so that the system plus instrument is treated as a composite
quantum system. Similar shifts are possible if the measuring instrument is subdivided
into several component systems, e.g., if a recording device is regarded as a separate
component system, or if the observer is subdivided into component systems involved
in the registration of a measurement outcome.
On the relative state interpretation, the probability that S is in the state |a′〉 but the
observer sees a is
qψ(|a′〉, a) = Tr(Pa′ ⊗ PAa · V PψV †) = δa′,a (6)
So the probability that S is in the state |a〉 after O observes a is 1, as in the standard
theory according to the state update rule.
For a sequence of measurements of observables A and B by two observers, O1
and O2, on the same system S, the conditional probability for the outcome b given the
outcome a is
qψ(b|a) == qψ(a, b)∑
b qψ(a, b)
=
Tr(1⊗ PAa ⊗ PBb · VO2VO1PψV †O1V
†
O2
)∑
bTr(1⊗ PAa ⊗ PBb · VO2VO1PψV †O1V
†
O2
)
(7)
which turns out to be the same as the conditional probability given by the state update
rule: qψ(b|a) = pψ(b|a).
So Everett’s relative state interpretation and the information-theoretic interpreta-
tion make the same predictions, both for the probability of an outcome of an A-
measurement on a system S, and for the conditional probability of an outcome of a
B-measurement, given an outcome of a prior A-measurement on the same system S
by two observers,O1 and O2.
As Baumann and Wolf show, this is no longer the case for conditional probabili-
ties involving encapsulated measurements at different levels of observation, where an
observer, O measures an observable of a system S and a super-observer measures an
arbitrary observable of the joint system S + O. In other words, the movability of the
cut is restricted to measurements that are not encapsulated. Note that both the observer
and the super-observer could be quantum automata, so the analysis is not restricted to
observers as conscious agents.
Suppose an observerO measures an observable with eigenstates |a〉S on a system S
in a state |ψ〉S =
∑
a〈a|ψ〉|a〉S , and a super-observer SO then measures an observable
with eigenstates |b〉S+O in the Hilbert space of the composite system S +O.
On the information-theoretic interpretation of the standard theory, the state of S+O
after the measurement by O is |a ⊗ Aa〉S+O = |a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O , where |Aa〉O is the
memory state ofO correlatedwith the outcome a. The probability of the super-observer
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finding the outcome b given that the observer O obtained the outcome a is then
pψ(b|a) = |〈b|a⊗Aa〉S+O|2 (8)
On the relative state interpretation, after the unitary evolutions associated with the
observer O’s measurement of the S-observable with eigenstates |a〉, and the super-
observer SO’s measurement of the (S + O)-observable with eigenstates |b〉, the state
of the composite system S +O + SO is
|Ψ〉 =
∑
a,b
〈a|ψ〉〈b|a⊗Aa〉|b〉S+O|Bb〉SO (9)
where |Bb〉O is the memory state of SO correlated with the outcome b. The probability
of the super-observer SO finding the outcome b given that the observerO obtained the
outcome a is then qψ(b|a) as given by (7), with |Ψ〉〈Ψ| = VO2VO1PψV †O1V
†
O2
. The
numerator of this expression, after taking the trace over the (S+O)-space followed by
the trace over the O-space of the projection onto PBb followed by the projection onto
PAa , becomes
pψ(b|a)
∑
a′,a′′
〈a′|ψ〉〈ψ|a′′〉〈b|a′ ⊗Aa′〉〈a′′ ⊗Aa′′ |b〉 (10)
so
qψ(b|a) =
pψ(b|a)
∑
a′,a′′〈a′|ψ〉〈ψ|a′′〉〈b|a′ ⊗Aa′〉〈a′′ ⊗Aa′′ |b〉∑
bTr(1⊗ PAa ⊗ PBb · |Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
(11)
Baumann and Wolf point out that this is equal to pψ(b|a) in (8) only if |b〉S+O =
|a〉S ⊗ |Aa〉O for all b, i.e., if |b〉S+O is a product state of an S-state |a〉S and an
O-state |Aa〉O , which is not the case for general encapsulated measurements.
HereO’s measurement outcome states |Aa〉O are understood as relative to states of
SO, and there needn’t be a record ofO’s measurement outcome as classical or Boolean
information. If there is a classical record of the outcome then, as Baumann and Wolf
show, SO’s conditional probability is the same as the conditional probability in the
standard theory.
To see that the relative state interpretation leads to a modal contradiction, consider
the Frauchiger-Renner modification of the ‘Wigner’s Friend’ thought experiment [2].
Frauchiger and Renner add a second Friend (F ) and a second Wigner (W ). Friend
F measures an observable with eigenvalues ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ and eigenstates |h〉, |t〉
on a system R in the state 1√
3
|h〉 +
√
2
3
|t〉. One could say that F ‘tosses a biased
quantum coin’ with probabilities 1/3 for heads and 2/3 for tails. She prepares a qubit
S in the state | ↓〉 if the outcome is h, or in the state | →〉 = 1√
2
(| ↓〉 + | ↑〉) if the
outcome is t, and sends S to F . When F receives S, he measures an S-observable with
eigenstates | ↓〉, | ↑〉 and corresponding eigenvalues − 1
2
, 1
2
. The Friends F and F are
in two laboratories, L and L, which are assumed to be completely isolated from each
other, except briefly when F sends the qubit S to F .
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Now suppose thatW is able to measure an L-observable with eigenstates
|fail〉L =
1√
2
(|h〉L + |t〉L)
|ok〉L =
1√
2
(|h〉L − |t〉L)
andW is able to measure an L-observable with eigenstates
|fail〉L = 1√
2
(| − 1
2
〉L + |1
2
〉L)
|ok〉L = 1√
2
(| − 1
2
〉L − |1
2
〉L)
Suppose W measures first and we stop the experiment at that point. On the rela-
tive state interpretation, F ’s memory and all the systems in F ’s laboratory involved in
the measurement of R become entangled by the unitary transformation, and similarly
F ’s memory and all the systems in F ’s laboratory involved in the measurement of S
become entangled. If R is in the state |h〉R and F measures R, the entire laboratory L
evolves to the state |h〉L = |h〉R|h〉F , where |h〉F represents the state of F ’s memory
plus measuring and recording device plus all the systems in F ’s lab connected to the
measuring and recording device after the registration of outcome h. Similarly for the
state |t〉L, and for the states | − 12 〉L = | − 12 〉S | − 12 〉F and | 12 〉L = | 12 〉S | 12 〉F of F ’s
lab L with respect to the registration of the outcomes± 1
2
of the spin measurement. So
after the evolutions associated with the measurements by F and F , the state of the two
laboratories is
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
|h〉L| −
1
2
〉L +
√
2
3
|t〉L
| − 1
2
〉L + | 12 〉L√
2
(12)
=
1√
3
|h〉L| −
1
2
〉L +
√
2
3
|t〉L|fail〉L (13)
According to the state (13), the probability is zero thatW gets the outcome ‘ok’ for his
measurement, given that F obtained the outcome t for her measurement.
Now suppose that W andW both measure, andW measures beforeW , as in the
Frauchiger-Renner scenario. What is the probability that W will get ‘ok’ at the later
time given that F obtained ‘tails’ at the earlier time? The global entangled state at
any time simply expresses a correlation between measurements—the time order of the
measurements is irrelevant. The two measurements by W and W could be spacelike
connected, and in that case the order in which the measurements are carried out clearly
can’t make a different to the probability.4
Since observers in differently moving reference frames agree about which events
occur, even if they disagree about the order of events, an event that has zero probability
in some reference frame cannot occur for any observer in any reference frame.5 In a
4Thanks to Renato Renner for pointing this out.
5In [19], Allen Stairs and I proposed this as a consistency condition to avoid potential contradictions in
quantum interactions with closed timelike curves.
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reference frame in which W measures before W the probability is zero that W gets
‘ok’ if F gets ‘tails,’ because this must be the same as the probability if we take W
out of the picture. It follows that if F gets ‘tails,’ the ‘ok’ measurement outcome event
cannot occur in a reference frame in whichW measures beforeW .
Think of it from F ’s perspective. If she is certain that she found ‘tails,’ she can
predict with certainty that W ’s later measurement (timelike connected to her ‘tails’
event) will not result in the outcome ‘ok.’ She wouldn’t (shouldn’t!) change her pre-
diction because of the possible occurrence of an event spacelike connected to W ’s
measurement—not if she wants to be consistent with special relativity. W finding ‘ok’
is a zero probability event in the absolute future of F ’s prediction that cannot occur
for F given the ‘tails’ outcome of her R-measurement, and hence cannot occur in any
reference frame. The fact thatW ’s measurement, an event spacelike connected toW ’s
measurement, might occur after her prediction doesn’t support altering the prediction,
even though it would make F ’s memory of the earlier event (and any trace of the ear-
lier event in F ’s laboratoryL) indefinite, so no observer could be in a position to check
whether or not F obtained the earlier outcome t whenW gets ‘ok.’
The state (13) can be expressed as
|Ψ〉 = 1√
12
|ok〉L|ok〉L −
1√
12
|ok〉L|fail〉L +
1√
12
|fail〉L|ok〉L +
√
3
2
|fail〉L|fail〉L
(14)
It follows that the probability that both Wigners obtain the outcome ‘ok’ is 1/12. Since
the twoWigners measure commuting observables on separate systems,W can commu-
nicate the outcome ‘ok’ of her measurement toW , and her prediction that she is certain,
given the outcome ‘ok,’ thatW will obtain ‘fail,’ without ‘collapsing’ the global entan-
gled state. Then in a round in whichW obtains the outcome ‘ok’ for his measurement
and so is certain that the outcome is ‘ok,’ he is also certain that the outcome of his
measurement is not ‘ok.’
Frauchiger and Renner derive this modal contradiction on the basis of three as-
sumptions, Q, S, and C. Assumption Q (for ‘quantum’) says that an agent can ‘be cer-
tain’ of the value of an observable at time t if the quantum state assigns probability 1 to
this value after a measurement that is completed at time t, and the agent has established
that the system is in this state. An agent can also ‘be certain’ that the outcome does
not occur if the probability is zero. One should also include under Q the assumption
that measurements are quantum interactions that transform the global quantum state
unitarily. Assumption S (for ‘single value’) says, with respect to ‘being certain,’ that
an agent can’t ‘be certain’ that the value of an observable is equal to v at time t and
also ‘be certain’ that the value of this observable is not equal to v at time t.6 Finally,
assumption C (for ‘consistency’) is a transitivity condition for ‘being certain’: if an
agent ‘is certain’ that another agent, reasoning with the same theory, ‘is certain’ of the
value of an observable at time t, then the first agent can also ‘be certain’ of this value
at time t.
6The standard axiom system for the modal logic of the operator ‘I am certain that’ includes the axiom ‘if
I am certain that A, then it is not the case that I am certain that not-A’ (assuming the accessibility relation is
serial and does not have any dead-ends). Thanks to Eric Pacuit for pointing this out.
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As used in the Frauchiger-Renner argument, ‘being certain’ is a technical term en-
tirely specified by the three assumptions. In other words, ‘being certain’ can mean
whatever you like, provided that the only inferences involving the term are those sanc-
tioned by the three assumptions. In particular, it is not part of the Frauchiger-Renner
argument that if an agent ‘is certain’ that the value of an observable is v at time t, then
the value of the observable is indeed v at time t—the observable might have multi-
ple values, as in the Everett interpretation. So it does not follow that the proposition
‘the value of the observable is v at time t′’ is true, or that the system has the property
corresponding to the value v of the observable at time t. Also, it is not part of the
Frauchiger-Renner argument that if an agent ‘is certain’ of the value of an observable,
then the agent knows the value, in any sense of ‘know’ that entails the truth of what the
agent knows.
The argument involves measurements, and inferences by the agents via the notion
of ‘being certain,’ that can all be modeled as unitary transformations to the agents’
memories. So picture the agents as quantum automata, evolving unitarily, where these
unitary evolutions result in changes to the global quantum state of the two friends and
the two Wigners that reflect changes in the agents’ memories. What Frauchiger and
Renner show is that these assumptions lead to memory changes that end up in a modal
contradiction.
Obviously, the relative state interpretation is inconsistent with the assumption S in
the sense that different branches of the quantum state can be associated with different
values of an observable after a measurement. So, with respect to a particular branch, an
agent can be certain that an observable has a certain value and, with respect to a differ-
ent branch, an agent associated with that branch can be certain that the observable has
a different value. This is not a problem. Rather, the problem for the relative state inter-
pretation is that there is a branch of the global quantum state afterW ’s measurement,
which has a non-zero probability of 1/12, with a memory entry that is inconsistent with
S: W is certain that the outcome of his measurement is ‘fail’ and also certain that the
outcome is ‘ok.’
Renner gives a full description of the state of the global system as it evolves unitar-
ily with the measurements and inferential steps at every stage of the experiment, which
is repeated over many rounds untilW andW both obtain the outcome ’ok’ [20]. The
measurements are assumed to be performed by the agents F , F,W,W in sequence
beginning at times 00, 10, 20, and 30 (and ending at times 01, 11, 21, and 31).
So, for example, in round n after F ’s measurement the global entangled state is
|Ψ〉n:11 (cf. (12)):
1√
3
|h〉R|h, no conclusion〉F | ↓〉S |z = −
1
2
〉F
+
√
1
3
|t〉R|t, so I am certain thatw = fail at n:31〉F | ↓〉S |z = −
1
2
〉F
+
√
1
3
|t〉R|t, so I am certain thatw = fail at n:31〉F | ↑〉S |z =
1
2
〉F (15)
After the measurements by W and W with outcomes w¯ and w, the global entangled
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state is |Ψ〉n:31:
√
1
12
|ok〉L|ok, so I am certain that w = fail〉W |ok〉L|I am certain thatw = fail; I observe w = ok!〉W
−
√
1
12
|ok〉L|ok, so I am certain that w = fail〉W |fail〉L|I am certain that w = fail; I observe w = fail〉W
+
√
1
12
|fail〉L|fail, no conclusion〉W |ok〉L|no conclusion previously; I observe w = ok〉W
+
√
3
2
|fail〉L|fail, no conclusion〉W |fail〉L|no conclusion previously; I observew = fail〉W (16)
The inconsistency with S is apparent on the first branch.
4 A Clarification
Baumann and Wolf argue that standard quantummechanics with the ‘collapse’ rule for
measurements, and quantum mechanics on Everett’s relative state interpretation, are
really two different theories, not different interpretations of the same theory. For the
Frauchiger-Renner scenario, they derive the conditional probability
pΨ(okW |tF ) = 0 (17)
for the standard theory by supposing that F updates the quantum state on the basis of
the outcome of her measurement of R and corresponding state preparation of S, but
F ’s measurement is described as a unitary transformation from F ’s perspective, so the
state of the two labs after the measurements by F (assuming F found ‘tails’) and F is
|t〉L(| − 12 〉L + | + 12 〉L) = |t〉L|fail〉L. For the relative state theory, they derive the
conditional probability
qΨ(okW |tF ) = 1/6 (18)
This would seem to be in conflict with the claim in the previous section that the proba-
bility is zero thatW gets the outcome ‘ok’ for his measurement, given that F obtained
the outcome ‘tails’ for her measurement, whether or notW measures beforeW .
To understand the meaning of the probability qΨ(okW |tF ) as Baumann and Wolf
define it, note that after the unitary evolution associated withW ’s measurement on the
lab L, the state of the two laboratories andW is (from (14))
Φ =
1√
12
|ok〉L|ok〉W |ok〉L −
1√
12
|ok〉L|ok〉W |fail〉L
+
1√
12
|fail〉L|fail〉W |ok〉L +
√
3
2
|fail〉L|fail〉W |fail〉L (19)
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which can be expressed as
Φ =
1√
2
|h〉L
[√5
6
( 3√
10
|fail〉W −
1√
10
|ok〉W
)
|fail〉L
+
1√
6
( 1√
2
|fail〉W +
1√
2
|ok〉W
)
|ok〉L
]
1√
2
|t〉L
[√5
6
( 3√
10
|fail〉W +
1√
10
|ok〉W
)
|fail〉L
+
1√
6
( 1√
2
|fail〉W −
1√
2
|ok〉W
)
|ok〉L
]
(20)
Equation (20) is equivalent to (19) in Healey [21].
It follows from (20) that the joint probability qΦ(okW , tL) is defined after W ’s
measurement and equals 1/12. Since qΦ(okW , tL) + qΦ(failW , tL) = 1/12 + 5/12 =
1/2,
qΦ(okW |tL) =
qΦ(okW , tL)
qΦ(okW , tL) + qΦ(failW , tL)
= 1/6 (21)
The conditional probability qΦ(okW |tL) is derived from the jointly observable
statistics at the latest time in the unitary evolution, so at the time immediately after
W ’s measurement, followingW ’s prior measurement.7 AfterW ’s measurement of the
observable with eigenvalues ‘ok,’ ‘fail,’, the L-observable with eigenvalues ‘heads,’
‘tails’ is indefinite. The probability qΦ(okW |tL) refers to a situation in which a super-
observerW measures an observable with eigenvalues ‘heads’ or ’tails’ on L and notes
the fraction of cases whereW gets ‘ok’ to those in which this measurement results in
the outcome ‘tails.’ The ‘tails’ value in this measurement is randomly related to the
‘tails’ outcome of F ’s previous measurement beforeW ’s intervention, so the probabil-
ity qΦ(okW |tL), which Baumann and Wolf identify with qΦ(okW |tF ), is not relevant
to F ’s prediction thatW will find ‘fail’ in the cases where she finds ‘tails.’ Certainly,
given the disruptive nature of W ’s measurement, it is not the case that W will find
‘tails’ afterW ’s measurement if and only if F ’s measurement resulted in the outcome
‘tails’ at the earlier time beforeW ’s measurement.8
This is not a critique of Baumann and Wolf, who make no such claim. The purpose
of this section is simply to clarify the difference between the conditional probability
qΦ(okW |tF ), as Baumann and Wolf define it, and F ’s conditional prediction that W
will find ‘fail’ in the cases where she finds ‘tails.’
5 Concluding Remarks
Frauchiger and Renner present their argument as demonstrating that any interpretation
of quantum mechanics that accepts assumptions Q, S, and C is inconsistent, and they
point out which assumptions are rejected by specific interpretations. For the relative
7Thanks to Veronika Baumann for clarifying this.
8Thanks to Renato Renner for this observation.
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state interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation, they say that these interpreta-
tions conflict with assumption S, because
any quantum measurement results in a branching into different ‘worlds,’
in each of which one of the possible measurement outcomes occurs.
But this is not the issue. Rather, Frauchiger and Renner show something much more
devastating: that for a particular scenario with encapsulated measurements involving
multiple agents, there is a branch of the global quantum state with a contradictory
memory entry.
An interpretation of quantum mechanics is a proposal to reformulate quantum me-
chanics as a Boolean theory in the representational sense, either by introducing hid-
den variables, or by proposing that every possible outcome occurs in a measurement,
or in some other way. An implicit assumption of the Frauchiger-Renner argument
is that quantum mechanics is understood as a representational theory, in the minimal
sense that observers can be represented as physical systems, with the possibility that
observers can observe other observers. What the Frauchiger-Renner argument really
shows is that quantum mechanics can’t be interpreted as a representational theory at
all.
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